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INTERNATIONAL CONTROL
OF DEEP SEA MINERAL RESOURCES
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Introduction. The United States is
committed as a matter of national
policy to enter into negotiations with all
countries in the United Nations in a
serious attempt to bring the law of the
sea in line with " ... the needs of
modem technology and the concerns of
the international community."l These
needs and concerns are numerous and
often conflicting, and their resolution is
complicated by the fact that even the
preliminary negotiations are being conducted in the political forum of the
United Nations rather than on a quieter
technical level as in the case of the 1958
conventions. 2 If a general codification
of principles for the law of the sea is to
be agreed upon, then common interests
and elements upon which agreement can
be based must be found, and found in
relatively short order or the Law of the

Sea Conference scheduled for the
summer of 1973 will surely founder on
its own rhetoric. The place for agreement to start is in the area in which the
affected interests are least entrenched.
Using this criterion one can quickly
eliminate the issues of territorial seas
and the right of free transit since national security interests are involved.
Likewise legal clarification of the seaward limit of the Continental Shelf can
be eliminated because strong interests in
oil, fisheries, et cetera, are intimately
connected with this question. The
highly emotional question of pollution
in the oceans is recognized to be a part
of the larger question of the total
environment and as such is being dealt
with in a separate conference. Further
away from land, the so-called high seas
are again connected with national
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security interests, and the water column
beneath them is the concern of strongly
entrenched fishing interests. The deep
seabed is another matter, and it is here
that interests appear least entrenched.
There are two reasons for saying this.
First, commercial recovery of any deep
seabed resource has not started. Second,
on a national and international political
scale there appears to be general agreement that the deep seabed and its
resources should be reserved for all of
mankind. The "property of mankind
concept" appears then to serve a useful
purpose as a starting point from which
more general agreement can commence.
Indeed, the disagreement that exists on
the deep seabeds is not to whom do
they belong, but rather on the form of
an international regime to oversee them.
Resources of the Deep Seabed. If
there were nothing of interest to nations, industries, or individuals upon or
under the seabed, then agreement on an
international regime would be a relatively easy matter. 3 Indeed, a simple
scientific coordination agency such as
the existing International Oceanographic Commission would suffice. Such
is not the case, however, and a summary
of the known mineral wealth of the
oceans which is important to the problem of international agreement is given
by Wang. 4 In the deep oceans, recovery
of metal-rich oozes is speculated about,
as is the existence of oil and vein
mineral deposits, but the only resource
which has been identified beyond the
speculation stage are manganese nodules. These deposits are of particular
interest in this paper since their occurrence in grades of commercial interest
occurs in depths generally in excess of
3,000 meters, in geographical areas far
from even the most liberal interpretations of the boundary of the Continental Shelf, and well within the area
considered the property of all mankind.
Manganese Nodules as a Resource.
That interest in the nodules as are-

source has passed beyond the speculation stage or that of oceanographic
curiosity is amply demonstrated by the
fact that today no less than 33 major
companies have active programs of exploration and development. These include Deep Sea Ventures (Tenneco),
Kennecott Exploration (Kennecott
Copper), Hughes Tool, Lockheed and
Global Marine, Ocean Resources, Metallgesellschaft, Kaiser, International
Nickel, Nippon Steel, Sumimoto, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Societe Ie Nickel, et
cetera. 5 If one is to deal with the
problem of policy formation concerning
the resources of the deep seabed, then
the place to start is with the least
abstract resource, the manganese nodules.
In focusing on the manganese nodules one is immediately confronted with
the question of why major companies
from the United States, Japan, Germany, and France are interested in these
as a resource.
The answer to this essentially lies in
the composition of the nodules, the
location of analogous land deposits, and
the location of the companies involved.
The major elements composing manganese nodules are silica, manganese,
copper, iron, nickel, cobalt, lead, and
aluminum. Of particular interest are
cobalt, copper, nickel, and manganese.
Over 80 percent of the world's supply
of cobalt comes from the Congo. The
United States produces only slight
amounts as byproducts of the copper
industry. Germany, France, and Japan
produce none. The principal use of
cobalt is as a high-temperature alloying
agent in steel. Russia produces over 60
percent of the world's manganese. Manganese is vital to the steelmaking process. Nickel is also used, principally as an
alloying agent in steel. In many instances nickel and cobalt are interchangeable. Japan, the United States,
Germany, and France rank in the top
five as producers of steel, but none have
major land-based deposits of com-
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TABLE I
Metal

% Drywgt Content of Nodulesa

Low

High

Cobalt
Copper

0_2
1.2

0_5
1.6

Nickel

1.2

1.6

20.0

25.0

Manganese

Principal Land-based Producersb

Congo, Zambia
United States, U.S.S.R., Zambia,
Chile
Canada, New Caledonia, U.S.S.R.,
Cuba
U.S.S.R., Brazil, Republic of
South Africa, India, Ghana

Source: aThese are generally accepted values obtained by personal contact
with geologists at Woods Hole and various companies.
bCommodity Yearbook 1971_ For a complete listing of the more than 50
manganese producing countries, see U.S. Dept. of Interior, Bureau of Mines,
"Manganese in 1963, Mineral Industry Surveys.

mercially minable manganese, cobalt, or
nickel. Known world reserves of high
and good grade manganese ores, cobalt
ores, and nickel ores appear to be
adequate to supply all known and forecast needs well into the 21st century. 6
None of these strategic mineral deposits
exist in the major non-Communist countries. On the other hand, the principal
producing countries are, with the exception of Canada, countries which either
have relatively unstable governments or
are not particularly friendly with this
country or the other major free world
steel producers. It would seem desirable
from a national security point of view
to develop an independent source of
these ores.
Indeed, this point seems to have been
recognized for some time. In particular
regard to the sea, the 1966 Marine
Resources and Engineering Developmen t Act declares that "The marine
science activities of the United States
should be conducted so as to contribute
to the following objectives": and lists as
the first objective "The accelerated development of the resources of the
marine environment.,,7 The 1968 Report of the President to the Congress on
Marine Resources and Engineering
Development notes the national need
for "continuous access to an adequate,

dependable, and economic supply of
raw materials to meet the demands of
an expanding population with a rising
standard of living." It further sets the
criteria for Federal policy designed to
implement this. The policies should
contribute to economic development
and national security by assisting the
Nation in:
• developing adequate and dependable supplies of needed mineral raw
materials;
• acquiring mineral supplies at lowest costs consistent with the satisfaction
of other national objectives;
• emphasizing domestic supplies of
mineral resources to assist in maintaining favorable balance of payments;
• providing a climate for American
industry to produce efficiently under
competitive conditions, the minerals required for ~e domestic economy and
foreign trade;
• conserving the Nation's mineral
resources by using them wisely and
efficiently;
• preserving the quality of the environment while obtaining needed
minerals.
These criteria are repeated in subsequent reports made by the International
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Oceanographic Commission throughout
its entire existence.
The Bureau of Mines has a long
history of having supported development and exploitation of low-grade
domestic deposits of manganese. Nevertheless, there is no such project currently in existence. David B. Brooks in
his 1966 book Low Grade and NonConventional Sources of Manganese 8
clearly sets forth that, of the possible
alternate sources of manganese not residing in foreign territory, the deep sea
manganese nodules were the most attractive and the most likely to be
economically feasible. The only domestic sources of cobalt are closely tied to
copper because the production of cobalt
in this country is strictly as a byproduct
of the smelting and refining processes of
the domestic copper industry. 9
In the preceding few paragraphs the
first of the pressures upon any international convention becomes clear. It is
the highly developed nations which are
interested in exploiting the sea. It is in
their national interests to do so. In the
United States, to do so is clearly stated
national objective and policy. Hence,
any international agreement which must
be submitted for ratification to the U.S.
Senate clearly must foster the exploitation of the deep sea resources. On the
other hand, the nations which have
major land-based deposits with which
the minerals from manganese nodules
must compete all belong to the group
called the emerging or developing nations, and their interests would be to
protect their own production. Hence,
any international regime from their
point of view should be, in general,
repressive of deep sea mining. I 0 Any
agreement or convention which hopes
to be useful must provide for a reconciliation of these views.
Less disagreement exists concerning
the copper contained in the nodules.
The United States is a major producer
with only Chile and the Congo having
substantial deposits among the de-

vel oping nations. The static reserve index of the Bureau of Mines indicates a
40-year world reserve of copper at
current usage. However, this index is
based on a linear usage prediction while,
in fact, both domestic and world consumption of copper has been increasing
exponentially. In the case of copper this
increase has been about 3 percent per
year even with the considerable material
substitution and scrap recovery efforts
that currently exist. Calculations using
this more realistic exponential usage
curve show a world reserve of only 26
years. In other words, we are possibly
coming toward a period of resource
deficiency. I I A good illustration of the
advanced degree of depletion of copper
reserves lies in the fact that some 60
years ago the raw ore extracted from
the earth contained an average of 1.88
percent copper. Today it contains about
0.7 percent. I 2 When one considers that
the analysis of copper in manganese
nodules has produced results ranging
from 0.3 percent to over 3 percent with
an average in many areas of over 1
percent,13 the potential importance of
the source can be seen.
Economic Aspects of Nodule Mining
and Production. It would seem to be in
the international interest to develop a
new source of copper. The nodules
present such a new source. The difficulty in this approach of using copper as
a common meeting ground lies in the
economics of mining and extraction of
the minerals from the nodules. The
nodules which are minerally enriched
generally lie at depths of 3-5 km., thus
requiring development of new technology to gather or mine them. Further,
the copper and other minerals contained
in them are imbedded in a silica matrix
unlike any mineral deposits found on
land. Thus, in general, land-based
methods which are well developed will
not work on the deep sea nodules. 1 4
Mining of any mineral deposit, be it
land- or sea-based, requires very high
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levels of capital investment. In the case
of the sea-based mines the new technology required adds a high risk factor
onto the high capitalization. Alvin
KauJfman of the Bureau of Mines
gathered together many estimates. 1 5
Independent investigation has revealed
that, in general, the higher estimates of
Kauffman for production costs are
those in use today. The cost of operation can be said to be relatively low.
When one considers the cost of capital
in with the cost of operation, then the

total cost presents a different picture.
Table III assumes in all cases an
output of 1 million tons per year, taxes
at 50 percent of return on invested
capital. Kauffman assumed a 12 percent
return on $100 million before taxes.
This paper uses 30 percent return on an
investment of $200 million before
taxes. 1 6 The total costs of a manganese
nodule mining and refining company
can be seen to be somewhat higher than
previously thought, and the dominant
factor in the operation is clearly the

TABLE II-ESTIMATED COSTS OF PRODUCING METALS FROM
THE DEEP SEA MANGANESE NODULES ($/TON)
Cost Item

This Papera

Kauffman

Exploration
Lease Acquisition
Mining Cost
Transportation to Shore
Unloading
Benefication
Processing
Waste Disposal
(Environmental Protection)
Overhead
Cost of Operation

$

.70
2:50
5.00
1.00
1.00
2.00
20.00

$

.70
4.00
1.00
1.00
2.00
20.00

5.00
4.00

5.00
4.00

$41.20

$37.70

Source: aNo lease acquisition costs are included because they in part depend
on the regime under which rights are granted. Mining costs are based on those of
John L. Mero, Offshore Technology Conference 1971, Paper No. OTC 1410.
Processing costs are based on a process such as reported by Deep Sea Ventures in
D.M. Taylor, "Worthless Nodules Become Valuable," Ocean Industry, June 1971,
p. 27-28. All other costs are those of Kauffman in lieu of better figures.
TABLE III-TOTAL COSTS OF PRODUCING MANGANESE NODULES (S/TON)
Cost Item

Return on Capital
Investment
Taxes
Depreciation
Cost of Capital
Cost of Operation
(From Table II)
Total Cost of
Production

Kauffman

This Paper
4 year Writeoff

6 year Writeoff

8 year Writeoff

$ 6.00
6.00

$ 30.00
30.00
50.00

$ 30.00
30.00
33.33

S 30.00
30.00
25.00

$12.00

$110.00

$ 93.33

$ 85.00

41.20

37.70

37.70

37.70

$53.20

$147.70

$131.03

S122.70
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capital involved. The viability of the
industry can be examined by comparing
the recoverable value to the total cost.
No single answer is apparent here. Using
1970 average market prices, J 7 assuming
an optimistic 100 percent recovery of
the metals from the nodule, and using
the metal content range from table I,
the recoverable value of a million tons
of nodules would be as shown in table
IV.
What is immediately apparent from
comparing these figures with the costs
involved is that the whole operation is
somewhat marginal. If one is interested
only in the copper, nickel, and cobalt
content, then the capital investment
required had better be less than $100
million. Considering that projected capital costs for the recovery of the same
tonnage of nickel from lateritic ores as
from a million-ton nodule operation,
according to Le Que, is over $200
million, J 8 serious doubt is cast on the
credibility of the $100 million capital
investment figures. It is obvious that if
$200 million is required for a million
ton nodule operation, it will be profit-

able only if the manganese is recovered
and used in competition with the existing ferromanganese market. Even in this
case the operation, while definitely
viable, leaves little margin for error in
cost estimation or for market fluctuations.
The Problem of Market Impact. If
the nodules are to be mined then for
their total mineral content, they will be
in competition with land-based sources
of many countries and will have an
effect on and be affected by the manganese, copper, nickel, and cobalt markets. The question then is to what
degree is the concern of the developing
countries justified? To put this in perspective, assume the same million ton
per year operation presented in table I.
Bertrand de Jouvenil has estimated that
such an operation would yield the following as shown in table V.
While these figures would tend to indicate that the impact of a million tons of
nodules per year would be minimal, this
is not necessarily so. The true impact of
the metals from the nodules derives

TABLE IV-RECOVERABLE VALUE OF METALS
FROM DEEP SEA MANGANESE NODULES ($/TON)
Metal

High Content Value

Low Content Value

Nickel
Copper
Cobalt

$ 41.00
19.30
18.50

$30.50
14.40
7.40

Total Recoverable Value
Without Manganese

$ 78.80

$52.30

Managanese Considered
As a 50% Mn. Content
Ore Equivalent
Recoverable Value
of Other Metals

$ 13.25

$10.60

78.80

52.30

Total Recoverable Value

$ 92.05

$62.90

$ 47.50

$38.00

Manganese Considered
As a Ferromanganese Equivalent
Recoverable Value
of Other Minerals
Total Recoverable Value

78.80
$126.30

~
$90.30
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TABLE V

Metal
Nickel
Copper
Cobalt
Manganese Ore
(Equivalent)

Production Yield

% of 1968 World Production

12,600 tons
10,000 tons
2,400 tons

2.5
0.15
12.5

800,000 tons

5.0

Source: Bertrand de Jouvenil, "The Economic Potential of the Oceans," Paper
prepared for Pacem in Maribus working group meeting, October 1971.

from the fact that they act and are
classed as commodities. A commodity
exhibits the following characteristics:
• It is in differentiable. Thus no producer can obtain a higher price or better
trading terms through advertising or
product modification. He must accept
the open market price which prevails at
the time of the sale.
• Its marginal production costs,
labor and material, are a very small
fraction of total production costs. Thus
there is little short-term response to
price changes by producers.
• Its cost is generally a small fraction of the total cost of the products in
which it is used. Thus consumption is
relatively price inelastic.
• Price and production rates of commodities are quite unstable, generally
varying from 1 year to the next by 5 to
25 percent. 19
It is in the instability of the price and
production rates that the true effect is
exhibited. Examination of production
and price data for manganese reveals
many instances where a production increase of 10 percent resulted in a price
decrease of 20 percent and production
increases of 5 percent resulting in price
decreases of 10 percent. In general, such
a 2 to 1 (price change to production
change) ratio is also apparent in the
cobalt cycle. While this is a very simplistic view of a highly complicated process,
the point is that the effect of the
relatively sudden placement of the
metals from the manganese nodules on
t1:1e market will be out of proportion to

the fraction of the market which they
represent. 20 Since, in general, commodities account for some 90 percent
of the foreign exchange of the developing countries,21 it would seem
their concern is justified. For example, a
change of only 1 percent in the price of
copper means $6 million a year in
foreign exchange to the Government of
Chile. Further, if the mining companies
survive the price dip caused by their
entry, it can be expected that their
presence will have a continuing destabilizing effect upon the commodity market which will affect them as well as the
land-based producers. These market
fluctuations thus would appear to be a
common element linking the land- and
sea-based producers. It would be in the
interests of both to preclude a market
dip when the sea-based metals come
onto the market and to stabilize the
market in the long run, that is, to rid
the market of the major year-to-year
fluctuations in price.
Conclusions. Thus we may contend
that market impact is a common key to
the problem of deep sea resources. No
matter what the difference in technology required or special legal considerations or even the difference of
humanist philosophies behind the
mining and extracticm of land- and
sea-based mineral resources, they face
common problems in the world market
place. The central issue in defining a
policy for exploitation is not how to
mine the nodules or how to define a
tract of sea bottom or even who should
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own the sea bottom. It is rather how
these minerals are to be used after they
have been extracted from the nodules
which is critical. A policy defining the
desired impact that the deep sea minerals have upon the international mineral
market is the one against which all other
policy considerations should be placed
in perspective. The choice is simply
whether the minerals originating from
the seabed should be used to stabilize an
unstable commodities market or not.
The choice is relatively clear. To opt for
a free market means that, if an international regime is to be brought into
being, each of the subsidiary questionssuch as who owns the seabeds-must be
dealt with as generally separate, standing on its own merit. This could be
expected to lead to a long and acrimonious series of negotiations, which in turn
would severely decrease the chances of
any international settlement. On the
other hand, once agreement is reached
on the principle and means of using the
deep sea minerals to help stabilize the
world metals market prices, then one
would expect resolution of all subsidiary questions in a logical and more

rapid manner. Since the unstable market
affects both developed and developing
nations, it is in the interests of both to
adopt the premise of stabilization, provided the strategy of stabilization appears to be a feasible one.
Even if one adopts the long· term
view, as did the U.N. in its Secretary
General's Report on the Economic Effects of the Deep Sea Minerals/ 2 the
shorter term commodity fluctuations
are important. It is the purpose of the
Law of the Sea Conference to provide
legal principles and machinery with
some enduring qualities. The performance of the international regime
must be such that it can deal effectively
with the initial shorter term economic
problems as well as the long·term issues
or a crisis of confidence in the usefulness of the regime will result. The
attention span of the lesser developed
countries is too short to wait for longterm market expansion. If the international regime is to succeed and be
supported in the long run, considerably
more attention must be paid to the
impact of the deep sea minerals on the
commodity cycles.
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